Beschreibung: Cooperation plays a pivotal role in addressing shared problems and increasing joined welfare beyond what individuals alone are capable of. Yet, cooperation is also fragile. Individuals can be tempted to free-ride on the cooperation of others and numerous studies have shown that free-riding can quicky crowd out group cooperation altogether. Groups that do manage to overcome this free-rider problem may therefore become very selective about who is allowed to join the group and who is not. In this project we want to experimentally investigate to which degree group cooperation leads to increased exclusivity, in the sense that group members more likely block attempts of others to join their group, ultimately leading to more pronounced fault-lines between social groups.
For this project, we will design an interactive lab-study that will be performed by you together with a team of other students. We will invite groups of participants that will interact in real-time across computer-terminals in our social interaction laboratory.
The resulting paper can be written in German or English.
Related literature:
Marotzke, J., Semmann, D., & Milinski, M. (2020). The economic interaction between climate change mitigation, climate migration and poverty. Nature Climate Change, 10(6), 518-525.
Efferson, C., Roca, C. P., Vogt, S., & Helbing, D. (2016). Sustained cooperation by running away from bad behavior. Evolution and Human Behavior, 37(1), 1?9. doi: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2015.05.003
Ehrhart, K.-M., & Keser, C. (1999). Mobility and Cooperation: On the Run. Working Paper. Retrieved from https://www.cirano.qc.ca/files/publications/99s-24.pdf
Cinyabuguma, M., Page, T., & Putterman, L. (2005). Cooperation under the threat of expulsion in a public goods experiment. Journal of public Economics, 89(8), 1421-1435.
Charness, G., & Yang, C.-L. (2014). Starting small toward voluntary formation of efficient large groups in public goods provision. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 102, 119?132. doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.03.005
Page, T., Putterman, L., & Unel, B. (2005). Voluntary association in public goods experiments: Reciprocity, mimicry and efficiency. The Economic Journal, 115(506), 1032-1053.
Ahn, T. K., Isaac, R. M., & Salmon, T. C. (2008). Endogenous Group Formation. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 10(2), 171?194. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2008.00357.x
Ahn, T. K., Isaac, R. M., & Salmon, T. C. (2009). Coming and going: Experiments on endogenous group sizes for excludable public goods. Journal of Public Economics, 93(1?2), 336?351. doi: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.06.007
Khadjavi, M., & Tjaden, J. D. (2018). Setting the bar - an experimental investigation of immigration requirements. Journal of Public Economics, 165, 160?169. doi: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.07.013
Cimino, A. (2011). The Evolution of Hazing: Motivational Mechanisms and the Abuse of Newcomers. Journal of Cognition and Culture, 11(3?4), 241?267. doi: 10.1163/156853711x591242
Rand, D. G., & Nowak, M. A. (2013). Human cooperation. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 17(8), 413?425. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2013.06.003
Anzahl Arbeiten für dieses Thema: 3
Zeitrahmen: FS23
Eingabedatum: 06.12.2022
Kontakt: Prof. Dr. Jörg Gross, E-Mail
